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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Leonard Applebaum leased two automobiles from Nissan 
Motor Acceptance Corporation ("NMAC") through a 
dealership owned and operated by Reitenbaugh Enterprises 
("Reitenbaugh"). Applebaum sued NMAC and Reitenbaugh, 
contending that the early termination provisions in his 
leases violated the disclosure requirements of the 
Consumer Leasing Act ("CLA") and Regulation M, which 
implements the Act. The District Court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, and Applebaum took 
this appeal. We hold that the early termination provisions 
in the NMAC leases do not comply with the requirements of 
the CLA; we therefore reverse. 
 
I. 
 
On November 2, 1994, Applebaum signed a 36-month 
closed-end lease1 for a 1995 Nissan Maxima. The lease was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A "closed-end" lease is "[a] lease in which [the lessee is] not 
responsible for the difference if the actual value of the vehicle at the 
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between Applebaum and Reitenbaugh, but Reitenbaugh 
promptly assigned the lease to NMAC. Applebaum 
terminated his 1994 lease approximately 10 months before 
the end of the 36-month term in order to trade in his 1995 
Maxima for a 1997 model. As is common with automobile 
leases, NMAC's standard closed-end motor vehicle lease 
agreement imposed a penalty for early termination. The 
lease provided: 
 
       First, all monthly lease payments, which under the 
       terms of my lease, are not yet due and the residual 
       value of the vehicle are discounted to present value by 
       the Constant Yield Method at the rate implicit in the 
       lease (the "Adjusted Lease Balance"). This amount is 
       then reduced by the Realized Value (and insurance) 
       proceeds which you receive for the vehicle. The balance 
       due you is the Early Termination Charge which I will 
       pay to you immediately. If there is an excess, however, 
       you will not refund it to me. 
 
1994 Lease, App. at R3; 1997 Lease, App. at R4-5. In the 
course of negotiating the 1997 lease, Reitenbaugh quoted 
Applebaum a pay-off figure of $18,111. Reitenbaugh 
explained that after a trade-in allowance of $12,500 ("the 
Realized Value") he owed NMAC $5,611 as an early 
termination charge.2 
 
According to Applebaum, he was aware that there would 
be an early termination penalty but was surprised that it 
was so large. When he asked Reitenbaugh to explain how it 
had arrived at the pay-off figure, the dealer responded that 
it had not performed the calculation and had no idea how 
the figure had been derived. Reitenbaugh's practice was to 
call NMAC for the pay-off figure, and the dealer suggested 
that Applebaum call NMAC and ask how the figure was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
scheduled end of the lease is less than the residual value," but the 
lessee 
"may be responsible for excess wear and excess mileage charges and for 
other lease requirements." Federal Reserve Board Leasing Language (last 
updated March 29, 2000). 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/leasing/glossary htm>. 
 
2. The record shows that the residual value of Applebaum's 1995 Nissan 
was $15,018.30 and that the rate implicit in the lease was 8.910068. 
See App. at R-55. 
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calculated. Heeding Reitenbaugh's advice, Applebaum 
telephoned NMAC in early January 1997. Applebaum 
contends that his conversation with NMAC was equally 
unhelpful. Without a satisfactory explanation of how NMAC 
had calculated the early termination charge, Applebaum 
nonetheless entered into the 1997 lease. The $5,611 charge 
was capitalized into the lease payments under the 1997 
lease. 
 
Applebaum continued to seek an explanation of his early 
termination liability. Having failed to make headway on his 
own, Applebaum retained counsel. By letter to NMAC in 
July 1997, Applebaum's counsel requested a written 
explanation of how NMAC had arrived at the $18,111 pay- 
off figure. In reply, NMAC's legal department stated that it 
could not reconstruct the pay-off calculation because the 
computer system that performs the calculation does not 
retain pay-off information once an account has been 
terminated. Applebaum's counsel pressed for an 
identification of the residual value of the vehicle and how 
that value had been discounted to present value at the rate 
implicit in the lease using the constant yield method. See 
App. at R-9. NMAC responded that the rate was proprietary 
and that its prior disclosures were adequate to satisfy 
Regulation M. See App. at R-10. 
 
Applebaum then sued NMAC and Reitenbaugh, alleging a 
violation of the Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C.SS 1667- 
1667e. Applebaum contended that the early termination 
provision of the leases violated the CLA because the 
formula for computing the early termination charge was 
indecipherable and because the provision did not define 
some of the terms it used. The District Court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the 
CLA and Regulation M require an early termination clause 
to be "visible to the lessee and in a readable format" but 
that the clause "need not be simple enough to do the 
mathematical calculation of the exact amount." Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 8. The Court concluded that the lease provisions at 
issue here were not required to explain the constant yield 
method, a term that was "well known in the industry." Id. 
at 12. Likewise, the Court held that the lease provisions 
were not required to disclose the vehicles' residual value. 
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This term, the court commented, "is not void of meaning to 
the average consumer; it means whatever value remains in 
the vehicle when the lease terminates." Id . at 15. "The CLA 
and Regulation M," the Court added, "do not require further 
definition." Id. Applebaum then took this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
In 1976, in response to an emerging trend toward 
automobile leasing, Congress passed the Consumer Leasing 
Act ("CLA"), 15 U.S.C. S 1667-1667e as Chapter 5 of the 
Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. S 1607 et seq. The 
CLA was intended "to assure a meaningful disclosure of the 
terms of leases of personal property for personal, family, or 
household purposes so as to enable the lessee to compare 
more readily the various lease terms available to him, limit 
balloon payments in consumer leasing, enable comparison 
of lease terms with credit terms where appropriate, and to 
assure meaningful and accurate disclosures of lease terms 
in advertisements." 15 U.S.C. S 1601(b). The Senate Report 
accompanying the CLA stated that "[t]he purpose of the 
legislation is to provide consumers with meaningful 
information about the component and aggregate costs of 
consumer leases, so that they can make better informed 
choices between leases, and between leases and credit 
sales." See S. Rep. No. 94-590 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 431, 432. 
 
The Federal Reserve Board has been given the authority 
to issue rules implementing the CLA, see 15 U.S.C. S 1604, 
and the Board has exercised that authority by 
promulgating "Regulation M," 12 C.F.R. S 213 et seq. (In 
this case, we consider the version of Regulation M in effect 
prior to the 1996 amendment now in force.)3 The Board's 
staff has also issued official commentary regarding these 
provisions. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 
555, 568 (1980), the Supreme Court instructed that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In 1996, the Federal Reserve Board revised Regulation M and issued 
new commentary. Although these revisions became effective on October 
31, 1996, compliance was optional until October 1, 1997. Applebaum 
does not contend that these new provisions apply in this case. 
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Board's interpretation of the TILA and Regulation M should 
be accepted so long as they are "not irrational."4 
 
The CLA provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 
       Each lessor shall give a lessee prior to the 
       consummation of the lease a dated written statement 
       on which the lessor and lessee are identified setting out 
       accurately and in a clear and conspicuous manner  the 
       following information with respect to that lease, as 
       applicable: 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       (11) A statement of the conditions under which the 
       lessee or lessor may terminate the lease prior to the 
       end of the term and the amount or method of 
       determining any penalty or other charge for 
       delinquency, default, late payments, or early 
       termination. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1667a(11) (emphasis added). 
 
The version of Regulation M in effect at the time in 
question required that lessors' disclosures "be made clearly, 
conspicuously, in meaningful sequence, and in accordance 
with the further requirements of this section." 12 C.F.R. 
S 213.4(a)(1) (1995). The Official Staff Commentary for this 
provision explained that "clearly, conspicuously, and in 
meaningful sequence" required "that disclosures be in a 
reasonably understandable form." 12 C.F.R. Pt. 213, 
P 4(a)(1). This Commentary added that "while the regulation 
requires no particular mathematical progression or format, 
the disclosures must be presented in a way that does not 
obscure the relationship of the terms to each other." Id. 
 
With respect to provisions imposing an early termination 
penalty, Regulation M mandated that the lessor provide: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Ford Motor Credit Co. was decided before Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but we 
interpret Ford Motor Credit Co. to mean that the Board's interpretation of 
the TILA is governed by Chevron and that its interpretation of its own 
regulations is governed by Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 
413-14 (1945). 
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       A statement of the conditions under which the lessee 
       or lessor may terminate the lease prior to the end of 
       the lease term and the amount or method for 
       determining the amount of any penalty or other charge 
       for early termination. 
 
12 C.F.R. S 213.4(g)(12) (1995) (emphasis added).5 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
Applebaum argues that P 17 of the 1994 Lease and P 18 
of the 1997 Lease (collectively "the Leases") violate the CLA 
and Regulation M because their disclosures regarding the 
early termination charges are not set out "in a clear and 
conspicuous manner." Applebaum contends that the early 
termination provision is "so indecipherable that virtually no 
reader could comprehend it." Appellant's Br. at 21. 
Applebaum suggests that the Second Circuit's per curiam 
opinion in Lundquist v. Security Pacific Automotive Financial 
Services, 993 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1993), properly interpreted 
the meaning of the CLA's "clear and conspicuous manner" 
requirement. In Lundquist, the Court held that the early 
termination disclosures of an automobile lease agreement 
violated the CLA because they were "confusing, unduly 
complicated, and unnecessarily convoluted" and"beyond 
the understanding of the average consumer." Lundquist, 
993 F.2d at 15. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that provisions of Regulation M that were added in 1996 and 
that are now in effect address the chief issues that are presented in this 
case. The new Staff Commentary specifically states that a lease need 
only name the method of discounting to present value that it uses and 
need not explain how that method works. See 12 C.F.R. Pt. 213, P 4(g) 
(2000). 
 
In revising Regulation M, the Board specifically considered whether to 
require disclosure of the rate implicit in the lease but ultimately 
decided 
not to do so. See FRB Final Rule, 61 FR 52246, 52254-56 (Oct. 7, 1996). 
However, the revised version of Regulation M requires disclosure of 
residual value in both open- and closed-end leases. See 12 C.F.R. 
S 213.4(f)(4) (2000). 
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Lundquist was sharply criticized by the Seventh Circuit in 
Channell v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 383 (7th 
Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit confronted a challenge to a 
lessor's method of determining unearned interest in an 
early termination clause. The lessee asserted that a 
reference in the lease to the "Sum of the Digits" method 
was "incomprehensible to the average consumer and 
therefore violated the requirement that disclosures be clear 
and conspicuous." Id. at 381. Noting that 12 C.F.R. 
S 213.4(g)(12) could be satisfied by disclosing the "method 
of determining the amount of any penalty or other charge 
for early termination," the Court concluded that"only the 
method, and not the way the method works, needs to be 
disclosed." Id. at 382. The Court stated: 
 
       It is hard to read the statute and regulation any other 
       way. "Clear and conspicuous manner"--the language of 
       S 1667a -- means visible, not simple. "Manner" refers 
       to the mode of presentation, not the degree of 
       comprehension. The Act and Regulation M do not 
       define "clear and conspicuous," but the words are 
       staples of commercial law. The Uniform Commercial 
       Code defines "conspicuous" as "so written that a 
       reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought 
       to have noticed it." UCC S 1-201(10). A disclaimer of 
       the warranty of merchantability is enforceable if 
       conspicuous, see UCC S 2-316(2), even if the average 
       consumer hasn't the vaguest idea what a "warranty of 
       merchantability" entails. Regulation M calls for the use 
       of 10-point type at a minimum. S12 C.F.R. 213.4(a)(1). 
 
Id. 
 
Turning to Lundquist, the Court observed: 
 
       We confess to substantial difficulty deciphering the 
       opinion in Lundquist. . . . The court does not explain 
       why the operation of a formula must be simple--for the 
       Act requires a clear presentation but does not limit the 
       number of variables the lessor may consider. The 
       quoted words "confusing, unduly complicated, and 
       unnecessarily convoluted" lack a source-- they are not 
       quoted from anything, and a search of a database 
       containing all federal opinions of the last 50 years did 
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       not turn up any other uses of that phrase. It does not 
       appear anywhere in the United States Code or the Code 
       of Federal Regulations. 
 
Id. at 383. 
 
B. 
 
Under 15 U.S.C. S 1667a(11), the leases at issue in this 
case were required to disclose either the "amount or 
method for determining" the early termination charge. Since 
the amount was not disclosed, the critical question is 
whether the "method" was revealed in the way that the law 
demands. Under 15 U.S.C. S 1667a, this disclosure had to 
be effected "in a clear and conspicuous manner." 
 
The term "conspicuous" is unambiguous. In ordinary 
usage, it means "obvious to the eye" or "plainly visible." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 485 (1971). 
See also Channell, 89 F.3d at 381 (citing similar definition 
in UCC S 1-201(10)). Here, Applebaum does not contend 
that the disclosures in the early termination provision were 
not "conspicuous." 
 
The term "clear," on the other hand, may be interpreted 
in several different ways. Among other things, it may mean: 
(1) "easily visible or distinguishable," (2)"without 
misconception, error, or vagueness," or (3) "easily 
understood." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
419. In S 1667a, the term "clear" might refer to the physical 
characteristics of the printing used in the lease, or it might 
refer to the characteristics of the language used in making 
the required disclosures. If the Channell opinion suggests 
that the first meaning is the only possible one, see 89 F.3d 
at 382 (" `Clear and conspicuous'--the language of S 1667a 
--means visible . . . ."), we respectfully disagree. Because 
the statutory language is ambiguous, it is appropriate to 
consider the Federal Reserve Board's interpretation of this 
provision. 
 
The Board's Official Staff Commentary adopts an 
interpretation that refers to the characteristics of the 
language used in making the disclosures. This Commentary 
states that disclosures must be made "in a reasonably 
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understandable form." 12 C.F.R. Pt. 213, P 4(a)(1) (1995). 
"Understandable" means more than "legible"; many things 
are legible but not understandable. It is therefore apparent 
that the Official Staff Commentary interprets the term 
"clearly" to refer to meaning, not just appearance. We defer 
to this interpretation. We thus hold that disclosure of the 
method of calculating an early termination penalty must 
not only be legible; it must also be "reasonably 
understandable." 
 
To say that the language used in a disclosure must be 
cast in "reasonably understandable form," however, is not 
to say that the meaning of this language must be within 
"the understanding of the average consumer," as the 
Second Circuit has suggested. Lundquist, 993 F.2d at 15. 
Here, as in other areas of the law, what is reasonable 
depends on the surrounding circumstances. Thus, the CLA 
and Regulation M require disclosure in a form that is 
"reasonably understandable" in light of the inherent 
difficulty or complexity of the method described; they do 
not necessarily demand disclosure in a form that the 
average consumer can understand. We recognize that some 
methods used in calculating early termination penalties 
involve math that is well beyond the understanding of the 
average consumer. If 15 U.S.C. S 1667a and 12 C.F.R. 
S 213.4 (1995) meant that any method of determining an 
early termination penalty had to be capable of explanation 
in a way that the average consumer could understand, 
these provisions would in effect impose substantive 
restrictions on the methods that a lessor could employ. It is 
plain, however, that these provisions were not intended to 
impose any such substantive restrictions.6  
 
C. 
 
With these standards in mind, we turn to the leases at 
issue here. As previously noted, they provide in pertinent 
part as follows: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. To clarify, we mean that disclosure must be cast in a form that is 
reasonably understandable in light of the difficulty of the matter being 
disclosed. The benchmark is the nature of the matter discussed. 
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       First, all monthly lease payments, which under the 
       terms of my lease, are not yet due and the residual 
       value of the vehicle are discounted to present value by 
       the Constant Yield Method at the rate implicit in the 
       lease (the "Adjusted Lease Balance"). This amount is 
       then reduced by the Realized Value (and insurance) 
       proceeds which you receive for the vehicle. The balance 
       due you is the Early Termination Charge. 
 
App. at R3, R4-5. 
 
This language plainly satisfies one of the requirements 
set out in the Federal Reserve Board Staff Commentary, 
viz., this language "does not obscure the relationship of the 
terms to each other." 12 C.F.R. Pt. 213, P 4(a)(1) (1995). On 
the contrary, the relationship of the terms is easy to grasp: 
 
       Early Termination Charge = Adjusted Lease Balance 
       - Realized Value. 
 
       Adjusted Lease Balance = (Residual Value  + unpaid 
       present value) discounted to present value at the Rate 
       Implicit in the Lease using the Constant Yield 
       Method. 
 
If the terms "constant yield method," "rate implicit in the 
lease," and "residual value," were "reasonably 
understandable," the method used in calculating the early 
termination penalty would be as well. We therefore consider 
those specific terms. 
 
IV. 
 
Applebaum contends that the terms "constant yield 
method," "rate implicit in the lease," and"residual value" 
should have been explained in the leases. The version of 
Regulation M in effect at the time in question required 
leases covered by the CLA to disclose numerous categories 
of specific information, see 12 C.F.R.S 213.4(g)(1)-(15) 
(1995), but Regulation M did not specifically require a 
definition or description of any of these terms. 
 
Constant Yield Method 
 
The "constant yield method" is a technical term with a 
specified meaning. A Federal Reserve Board webpage that 
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explains terms related to vehicle leasing defines the 
constant yield method as follows: 
 
       The method of earning rent charges in which the rent 
       charge earned each month is proportional to the 
       remaining lease balance. Under this method, the lessor 
       or assignee earns rent charges at an equal rate over 
       the term, similar to most home first mortgages. 
 
Federal Reserve Board, Leasing Language (last updated 
March 29, 2000) <http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ 
leasing/glossary.htm>. Use of this method, however, is 
not easy. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. S 1.1272-1 (b) (setting out 
steps for using constant yield method for certain tax 
purposes). In all likelihood, the vast majority of lay persons 
could not discount to present value using the constant 
yield method even if a description were provided."A 
beneficial set of disclosure rules gives the consumer 
information that can be put to use, while withholding 
technical information that distracts attention from the rest 
of the disclosures." Channel, 89 F.3d at 382. 
 
Under these circumstances, we hold that simply 
disclosing that the "constant yield method" was used, 
without attempting to explain how to use this method, 
satisfied the "reasonably understandable" requirement. 
Although the Official Staff Commentary to the current 
version of Regulation M does not change the law 
retroactively, we are persuaded by the staff 's determination 
that simply naming an established method of discounting 
to present value, without attempting to explain the method 
in the lease itself, is sufficient to make a lease reasonably 
understandable for present purposes. This commentary 
states: 
 
       [F]or purposes of the early termination charge a lessor 
       may use the name of a generally accepted method of 
       computing the unamortized cost portion (also known 
       as the "adjusted lease balance") of its early termination 
       charges. For example, a lessor may state that the 
       "constant yield" method will be utilized in obtaining the 
       adjusted lease balance 
 
12 C.F.R. Part 213, P 4(g) (2000). 
 
                                12 
  
Rate Implicit in the Lease 
 
Every discounting method must employ some discount 
rate, but early termination provisions rarely set forth such 
a rate. The presumption in these leases, apparently, is that 
whatever the named discounting method, it will be carried 
out at the rate implicit in the lease. We view the leases' 
reference to the rate implicit in the lease as surplusage, 
since NMAC would have been required to discount at the 
rate implicit in the lease even in the absence of such a 
reference. We also note that the Board has declined to 
impose an obligation that lessors disclose the lease rate 
after giving the question considerable thought and 
attention. See FRB Final Rule, 61 FR 52246, 52254-55. 
 
Residual Value 
 
Although the NMAC leases use the concept of "residual 
value" in calculating the early termination penalty, the 
leases do not define that term or specify the vehicles' 
residual value. What is more, neither Reitenbaugh nor 
NMAC provided this information to Applebaum or his 
attorney, despite their requests.7 
 
"Residual value," like the constant yield method, is a 
term with an established meaning in the leasingfield. The 
Federal Reserve Board's webpage defines the term as 
follows: "The end-of-term value of the vehicle established at 
the beginning of the lease and used in calculating your 
base monthly payment . . . ." Federal Reserve Board, 
Leasing Language (last updated March 29, 2000) 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/leasing/ 
glossary.htm>. Similarly, the term is now defined by 12 
C.F.R. S 213.2(n) (2000) as "the value of the leased property 
at the end of the lease term, as estimated or assigned at 
consummation by the lessor, used in calculating the base 
periodic payment." Moreover, it is apparent that this is 
precisely the sense in which the term is used in the NMAC 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that even had Reitenbaugh or NMAC provided Applebaum 
with the residual value upon his request, it would not have cured their 
disclosure violation. The duty to disclose under the CLA is breached, if 
at all, at the time of lease consummation. 15 U.S.C.S 1667a. 
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leases. Thus, "residual value" is not "whatever remains in 
vehicle when the lease terminates", Dist. Ct. Op. at 15; 
rather, "residual value" is a figure assigned by the lessor at 
the beginning of the lease. 
 
In order to discharge their disclosure obligations, the 
defendants in this case were required to reveal the residual 
value that had been assigned to Applebaum's cars. NMAC 
knew these figures, and it could have easily disclosed them. 
Its failure to do so meant that no one--not even a person 
capable of determining the rate implicit in the leases and 
capable of discounting to present value using the constant 
yield method--could have calculated an early termination 
penalty under the formula set out in the leases. An early 
termination clause that fails to reveal an otherwise 
unknowable variable used in determining an early 
termination penalty8 cannot be regarded as "reasonably 
understandable" in any meaningful sense of the term. 
 
NMAC's chief argument, which the District Court 
accepted, is that the Federal Reserve Board, in 
promulgating the version of Regulation M in effect at the 
time in question, implicitly determined that closed-end 
leases, like those involved in this case, did not have to 
reveal the vehicles' residual value. NMAC notes that the 
version of 12 C.F.R. S 213.4(g)(15) in effect at the time 
required an open-end lease to disclose the vehicle's residual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. This is distinguishable from information that is unknown to the lessor 
at the time of lease signing, for which the lessor is permitted to provide 
a reasonable estimate. See 15 U.S.C. S 1667a ("The Board may provide 
by regulation that any portion of the information required to be disclosed 
under this section may be given in the form of estimates where the 
lessor is not in a position to know exact information."); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 
213, P 4(d) (1995) ("The lessor may use estimates to make disclosures if 
necessary information is unknown or unavailable at the time the 
disclosures are made. . . . Estimates must be made on the basis of the 
best information reasonably available at the time disclosures are 
made."). For example, in Applebaum's leases, the early termination 
charge was a function of the Realized Value of the automobile -- viz., the 
value of the vehicle at the time of lease termination. Because the parties 
to the lease could not predict when the lease would terminate at the time 
they entered into the lease, it was sufficient to provide the method for 
determining Realized Value at lease end. See App. at 3. 
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value but that no such requirement was imposed with 
respect to closed-end leases. Warning against upsetting the 
FRB's regulatory scheme by imposing a disclosure 
obligation that the FRB declined to impose, NMAC urges 
that we not read the absence of a disclosure requirement as 
 
       the result of a lack of prescience; it may instead 
       betoken permission, or perhaps, considered abstention 
       from regulation. In that event, judges are not 
       accredited to supersede Congress or the appropriate 
       agency by embellishing upon the regulatory scheme. 
       Accordingly, caution must temper judicial creativity in 
       the face of legislative or regulatory silence. 
 
Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 U.S. at 565. 
 
We reject this argument because it overlooks a critical 
difference between open- and closed-end leases. An open- 
end lease is one in which the lessee's liability at the end of 
the lease term is based on the difference between the 
residual value of the leased property and its realized value.9 
Consequently, residual value is always relevant to a lessee's 
liability in an open-end lease, and the Board thus had a 
strong reason to require the disclosure of this value. By 
contrast, lessors need not, and often do not, use the 
concept of residual value in closed-end leases, and 
therefore, the Board's failure specifically to require the 
disclosure of residual value in closed-end leases cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as a considered decision that 
disclosure is not necessary to make a closed-end lease 
reasonably understandable if it uses that term. Here, NMAC 
constructed its early termination provision in such a 
manner as to make residual value an essential component 
of the calculation. Since the leases took this approach, 
defendants were obligated to disclose this value. They did 
not do so. 
 
In sum, we hold that the requirement to disclose in a 
"clear and conspicuous manner" the method of determining 
the amount of an early termination charge includes an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. See 12 C.F.R. S 213.2(j) (2000). We cite this subsequently promulgated 
provision to show the commonly understood meaning of this term, not 
because we regard it as legally binding in this case. 
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obligation to disclose the value of a variable, such as 
residual value, that is an essential component of the 
formula used in calculating the charge. Accordingly, we 
reverse and remand for the entry of judgment in favor of 
Applebaum and for the award of appropriate relief. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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